This paper investigates the heterogeneous response of exporters to real exchange rate ‡uctua-tions due to product quality. We combine a unique data set of highly disaggregated Argentinean …rm-level wine export values and volumes between 2002 and 2009 with experts wine ratings as a measure of quality. In response to a real depreciation, we …nd that …rms signi…cantly increase more their markups and less their export volumes for higher quality products, but only when exporting to high income destination countries. These results remain robust to di¤erent measures of quality, samples, speci…cations and to the potential endogeneity of quality. To motivate our …ndings we extend the model of Corsetti and Dedola (2005) with local distribution costs and allow …rms to export multiple products with heterogeneous levels of quality. The model shows that the elasticity of demand perceived by exporters decreases with a real depreciation and with quality, leading to more pricing-to-market and to a smaller response of export volumes to a real depreciation for higher quality goods. Overall our results help to explain the low exchange rate pass-through that is typically observed in aggregate data.
Introduction
Exchange rate ‡uctuations have small e¤ects on the prices of internationally traded goods. Indeed, empirical research typically …nds that the pass-through of exchange rate changes to domestic prices is incomplete (or in other words, import prices do not fully adjust to exchange rate changes). 12 A challenge for both economists and policymakers is to understand the reasons for incomplete passthrough as the latter has implications for the implementation of optimal monetary and exchange rate policies. 3 Possible explanations for partial pass-through include short run nominal rigidities combined with pricing in the currency of the destination market (Engel, 2003; Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon, 2010; Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008) , pricing-to-market strategies whereby exporting …rms di¤erentially adjust their markups across destinations depending on exchange rate changes (Atkeson and Burstein, 2008; Knetter, 1989 Knetter, , 1993 or the presence of local distribution costs in the importing economy (Burstein, Neves and Rebelo, 2003; Corsetti and Dedola, 2005) . 4 With the increasing availability of highly disaggregated …rm-and product-level trade data in recent years, a strand of the literature has started to investigate the determinants of incomplete pass-through from the perspective of exporting …rms. 5 This approach is of interest as it allows us to explore the pricing behavior of exporters in response to exchange rate shocks. Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012) analyze the heterogeneous reaction of French exporters to real exchange rate changes and …nd that, following a real depreciation, high performance …rms (i.e., highly productive or larger …rms) increase signi…cantly more their export prices, leading to lower pass-through. Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro and Vichyanond (2013) focus on multi-product Brazilian exporters and show that within …rms, pricingto-market is stronger for the products the …rm is most e¢cient at producing. Using …rm-level trade data for Belgian exporters, Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2012) …nd that exporters with high import shares and high export market shares have a lower exchange rate pass-through. 6 The …rst contribution of this paper is to explain the heterogeneous pricing-to-market behavior of exporting …rms by product-level characteristics, and more speci…cally by the quality of the goods exported. To date, the extensive literature on exchange rate pass-through provides very little evidence on the role of product-level characteristics (one exception being Chatterjee et al., 2013) . In order to …ll this gap, we focus on the wine industry which is an agriculture-based manufacturing sector producing di¤erentiated products. We combine a unique data set of Argentinean …rm-level destination-speci…c export values and volumes of highly disaggregated wine products with experts wine ratings to measure quality. 7 The …rm-level trade data are from the Argentinean customs and provide, for each export ‡ow between 2002 and 2009, the name of the exporting …rm, the country of destination, the date of the shipment, the FOB value of exports (in US dollars) and the volume (in liters) of wine exported. For each wine we have its name, grape (Chardonnay, Malbec, etc.) , type (white, red or rosé) and vintage year. With such detailed information we can de…ne a "product" in a much more precise way compared to the papers that rely on trade classi…cations such as the Harmonized System (HS) to identify products (e.g., Amiti et al., 2012; Auer and Chaney, 2009; Berman et al., 2012; Chatterjee et al., 2013) . For instance, Argentina's 12-digit HS classi…cation only groups wines into eleven di¤erent categories or "products." In contrast, as we de…ne a product according to the name of the wine, its grape, type and vintage year, the sample we rely on for the estimations includes 6,720 di¤erent wines exported by 209 wine producers. The exporters in the sample are therefore multi-product …rms.
In order to assess the quality of wines we rely on two well-known experts wine ratings, the Wine Spectator and Robert Parker. In both cases a quality score is assigned to a wine according to its name, grape, type and vintage year which are characteristics we all observe in the customs data so the trade and quality data sets can directly be merged with each other. Quality is ranked on a (50,100) scale with a larger value indicating a higher quality. Our approach to measuring quality is similar to Crozet, Head and Mayer (2012) who match French …rm-level export data of Champagne with experts quality assessments in order to investigate the relationship between quality and trade.
We compute Free On Board (FOB) export unit values as a proxy for export prices at the …rm-product-destination level, and investigate the pricing strategies of exporters in response to real exchange rate ‡uctuations between trading partners (i.e., between Argentina and each destination country). Consistent with other …rm-level studies, we …nd that pass-through is large: in our baseline regression, following a 10 percent real depreciation exporters increase their export prices by 1.1 percent so pass-through is 89 percent. Also, as expected, we …nd that higher quality is associated with higher prices, in line with Crozet et al. (2012) . Most interestingly, we show that the response of export prices to real exchange rate changes increases with the quality of the wines exported, or in other words pass-through decreases with quality. Pass-through is complete for the wine with the lowest quality in the sample but drops to 86.5 percent for the highest quality wine. Quantitatively, the e¤ect of quality in explaining heterogeneous pass-through is therefore large. This heterogeneity in the response of export prices to exchange rate changes remains robust to di¤erent measures of quality, samples and speci…cations. We also examine the heterogeneous response of export volumes to real exchange rate ‡uctuations. Export volumes increase following a real depreciation, but by less for higher quality goods. Finally, we …nd that the response of export prices (volumes) to real exchange rate changes increases (decreases) with quality only when …rms export to high income destination countries.
One concern with our estimations is the potential endogeneity of quality in explaining unit values and export volumes. Although both the Wine Spectator and Parker rating systems are based on blind tastings where the price of each wine is unknown, the tasters are told the region of origin or the vintage year and this might a¤ect in a way or the other the scores they assign to the di¤erent wines, leading to an endogeneity bias. In order to overcome this issue, we use appropriate instruments for quality based on geography and weather-related factors including the total amount of rainfall and the average temperatures during the growing season for each province where the grapes are grown, as well as the altitude of each of the growing regions of Argentina. We show that our main …ndings remain robust to the instrumentation of quality.
The second contribution of the paper is to develop a theoretical model to guide our empirical speci…cations and predictions. We extend the model of Corsetti and Dedola (2005) allowing …rms to produce and export multiple products with heterogeneous levels of quality where higher quality goods have higher marginal costs. In the presence of additive local distribution costs paid in the currency of the importing country, the model shows that the demand elasticity perceived by the …rm falls with a real depreciation and with quality. As a result, following a real depreciation exporters increase their prices more, and their export volumes less, for higher quality products. Once we allow for higher income countries to have a stronger preference for higher quality goods, as the evidence from the empirical trade literature tends to suggest (Crinò and Epifani, 2012; Hallak, 2006) , the heterogeneous response of prices and quantities to exchange rate changes due to quality is predicted to be stronger for higher income destination countries. Overall our empirical results …nd strong support for the predictions of the model. Our paper belongs to two strands of the literature. The …rst one is the vast literature on incomplete exchange rate pass-through and pricing-to-market. The majority of papers usually estimate a low level of exchange rate pass-through. For instance, in a sample of OECD countries Campa and Goldberg (2005) …nd an average pass-through of 46 percent in the short run and 64 percent in the long run. Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) …nd that the pass-through on US import prices is only 22 percent. In contrast, we …nd a large degree of exchange rate pass-through of 89 percent, a magnitude which is consistent with the estimates of other …rm-level studies.
Our paper is closely related to Chaney (2009) and Sauré (2012) who explore the relationship between quality and pass-through. However, as the two papers rely on import and consumer prices data, respectively, their empirical analysis investigates exchange rate pass-through rather than the pricing-to-market behavior of exporting …rms. But consistent with our paper, these authors predict that pass-through should be higher for lower quality goods. 8 Auer and Chaney (2009) do not …nd any evidence for such a relationship using import prices data for the US, where quality is inferred from trade unit values. In contrast, using a data set on the prices and numbers of cars traded in Europe, Auer et al. (2012) …nd some evidence that pass-through decreases with hedonic quality indices estimated from regressions of car prices on car characteristics such as weight, horse power and fuel e¢ciency.
Second, this paper relates to the growing literature on quality and trade. Assessing the role of quality in explaining trade patterns is still a challenge as product quality is generally unobserved. The empirical trade literature has attempted to deal with this problem by using trade unit values as a proxy for quality. 9 At the country level, Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Schott (2004) focus on the supply-side and show that export unit values are increasing in exporter per capita income. On the demand-side, Hallak (2006) …nds that richer countries have a relatively stronger demand for high unit value exporting countries. More recently, some papers have started to investigate how quality relates to the performance of exporters using …rm-level data. Manova and Zhang (2012a) focus on Chinese …rm-level export prices and …nd some evidence of quality sorting in exports. Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) , Manova and Zhang (2012b) and Verhoogen (2008) highlight the correlation between the quality of inputs and of outputs focusing on Mexican, Chinese and Colombian …rms, respectively. Closest to our work is Crozet et al. (2012) who explain French …rm-level export prices and quantities of Champagne by experts ratings as a measure of quality. 10 The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we extend the model of Corsetti and Dedola (2005) , allowing for …rm heterogeneity where …rms export multiple products with di¤erent levels of quality. Section 3 describes our …rm-level exports customs data, the wine experts quality ratings and the macroeconomic data we use. Section 4 presents our main empirical results. Section 5 provides robustness checks while section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Pricing-to-Market and Quality Berman et al. (2012) extend the model with distribution costs of Corsetti and Dedola (2005) , allowing for …rm heterogeneity where single-product …rms di¤er in their productivity. They show that the elasticity of demand perceived by the exporter falls with a real depreciation and productivity, leading to variable markups which increase with a real depreciation and productivity. This leads to heterogeneous pricing-to-market where more productive exporters increase their prices more than others following a real depreciation. 11 In their appendix, Berman et al. (2012) show that a similar result holds if …rms di¤er in the quality of the (single) good they export: …rms that export higher quality goods increase their export prices more than others in response to a real depreciation. Chatterjee et al. (2013) extend the model of Berman et al. (2012) to multi-product …rms. Inspired by Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2011) , each …rm is assumed to be most e¢cient at producing a key variety which is the …rm's "core competency," and the further away a variety is from the core, the relatively less e¢cient each …rm is at producing this variety. 12 In response to a real depreciation exporters increase their prices more for the products closer to their core competency, which in turn have a higher productivity and therefore smaller marginal costs.
In what follows we also extend Corsetti and Dedola (2005) allowing for …rm heterogeneity. Given that most …rms in our data set export multiple products, we model them as multi-product …rms which therefore di¤erentiates us from Berman et al. (2012) who focus on single-product …rms. In contrast 9 This approach is criticized by Khandelwal (2010) who instead compares exporters' market shares conditional on price to infer the quality of exports.
10 For additional evidence on the relationship between quality and trade, see Baldwin and Harrigan (2011 ), Hallak and Sidivasan (2011 ), Hummels and Skiba (2004 or Johnson (2012) , among others.
11 Berman et al. (2012) obtain similar predictions when using the models with endogenous and variable markups of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Atkeson and Burstein (2008) .
12 Li et al. (2012) also model multi-product …rms by ranking products according to their importance for the …rm.
to the multi-product …rms model of Chatterjee et al. (2013) , we however rank the di¤erent goods produced by each …rm in terms of quality rather than e¢ciency, where higher quality is associated with higher marginal costs. We then look at how changes in real exchange rates a¤ect the optimal price and quantity responses of exporters and derive some testable implications that can be taken to the data.
Although the quality of wine depends predominantly on the quality of the grapes which is itself mostly a¤ected by geography and weather-related factors, higher quality wines can be expected to have higher marginal costs (see Crozet et al., 2012, on Champagne) . First, higher quality wines may require higher quality and therefore more expensive inputs (Johnson, 2012; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Manova and Zhang, 2012a; Verhoogen, 2008) . For instance, wine producers can choose more or less costly additives to be added during the winemaking process (in the various stages of fermentation or as preservatives). Second, achieving higher quality wines may depend on the production methods used by producers which in turn a¤ect the yield. One example is "drip irrigation" which allows producers to limit the yield and therefore increase the potential quality of grapes, but this system is expensive to install. Finally, there is some evidence that in order to produce higher quality wines, Argentinean wineries often produce their own grapes for their best wines (which may need to be pruned and trimmed carefully, requiring more skilled labor) and rely on suppliers for their lower quality wines (Artopoulos, Friel and Hallak, 2011) .
The Basic Framework
The Home country (Argentina in our case) exports to multiple destinations in one sector characterized by monopolistic competition. The representative agent in destination country  has preferences over the consumption of a continuum of di¤erentiated varieties given by 13
where   () is the consumption of variety , () the quality of variety  and   1 the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The set of available varieties is ª. Quality captures any intrinsic characteristic or taste preference that makes a variety more appealing for a consumer given its price. Therefore, consumers love variety but also quality.
Firms are multi-product and produce goods with di¤erent levels of quality. They are heterogeneous in two dimensions: e¢ciency/productivity and product quality. The parameter , which denotes each variety, indicates how productive each …rm is at producing each variety so  has both a …rm-and a product-speci…c component. Each …rm produces one "core" product but in contrast to Chatterjee et al. (2013) or Mayer et al. (2011) who consider that a …rm's core competency lies in the product it is most e¢cient at producing -and which therefore has lower marginal costs -we assume that a …rm's core competency is in its product of superior quality which entails higher marginal costs (Manova and Zhang, 2012b) .
The productivity associated with the core product is given by a random draw © so each …rm is indexed by ©. Let us denote by  the rank of the products in increasing order of distance from the …rm's core, with  = 0 referring to the core product with the highest quality. Firms then observe a hierarchy of products based on their quality levels. A …rm with core productivity © then produces a product  with a productivity level  given by
where   1. Products with smaller  (higher quality) are closer to the core and therefore have a lower productivity  (© ). Higher quality goods have a lower productivity because they have higher marginal costs
where   1 implies that markups and therefore pro…ts increase with quality and  is the wage of the Home country (Berman et al., 2012) . 14 The closer a product is from the core with the highest quality (i.e., the smaller ), the lower is productivity  (© ) and the higher are marginal costs and quality ( (© )).
Firms face three types of transaction costs: an iceberg trade cost    1 (between Home and destination ), a …xed cost of exporting   (which is the same for all …rms and products and only depends on destination ) and an additive (per unit) distribution cost in destination . The latter captures wholesale and retail costs to be paid in the currency of the destination country. If distribution requires   units of labor in country  per unit sold and   is the wage rate in country , distribution costs are given by      ((© )). As in Berman et al. (2012) , we assume that higher quality goods have higher distribution costs. Most importantly, as distribution is outsourced so that distribution costs are paid in the currency of the importing country, they are una¤ected by changes in the exchange rate and by the e¢ciency of the exporter in producing each good.
In units of currency of country , the consumer price in  of a variety exported from Home to  is
where   () is the export price of the good exported to , expressed in Home currency, and   is the nominal exchange rate between Home and . It is straightforward to see that any change in the exchange rate   will lead to a less than proportional change in the consumer price    () (i.e., incomplete pass-through) given that local distribution costs are una¤ected by currency ‡uctuations. 15 14 See Crinò and Epifani (2012) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2011) for models where marginal costs decrease with …rm level productivity and increase with product quality. 15 The evidence in the literature suggests that local distribution costs are economically important. Burstein et al. (2003) show that distribution costs represent between 40 and 60 percent of the …nal retail prices across countries. Campa and Goldberg (2010) provide some evidence that local distribution costs, which represent between 30 and 50 percent of the total costs of goods exported by 21 OECD countries in 29 manufacturing industries, decrease the pass-through of exchange rates into import prices. For the beer industry, Hellerstein (2008) shows that incomplete pass-through can be explained by markup adjustments and the presence of local costs in roughly similar proportions.
The quantity demanded for this variety in country  is
where   and   are country 's income and aggregate price index, respectively. 16 The costs, in currency of the Home country, of producing   ()   units of each good (inclusive of transportation costs) and selling them to country  are
Expressed in Home currency, the pro…t maximizing export price for each product the …rm exports to country  is
where  ´    is the real exchange rate between Home and . In contrast to the standard DixitStiglitz markup (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) , the presence of local distribution costs leads to variable markups  ((© )) over marginal costs that are larger than
, increase with quality  ((© )), the real exchange rate   (i.e., a real depreciation) and local distribution costs   . 17 The volume of exports   () is given by
so the elasticity (in absolute value) of the exporter's demand   () with respect to the export price
which is decreasing in quality. For a product that is closer to the core, quality is higher, the elasticity of demand is smaller and the markup is higher. The model leads to two predictions on the e¤ects of exchange rate changes on export prices and quantities that can be tested in the data.
Prediction 1
The …rm-and product-speci…c elasticity of the export price   () to a change in the real exchange rate   , denoted by    and which captures the degree of pricing-to-market, increases 16 The aggregate price index in country  is given by  = 
. 17 To see how the markup increases with quality, let us rewrite the markup as
, a higher quality) increases the markup.
with the quality of the good exported, ((© )):
The …rm-and product-speci…c elasticity of the volume of exports   () to a change in the real exchange rate   , denoted by    , decreases with the quality of the good exported, ((© )):
Intuitively, the mechanism is the following. Because distribution costs are paid in the currency of the importing country, they are una¤ected by a real depreciation. Therefore, following a real depreciation the share of the consumer price in the destination country that depends on the export price becomes smaller. This reduces the elasticity of demand perceived by exporters in the destination country which allows all …rms to increase their markups. As higher quality goods have a smaller elasticity of demand, their markups can therefore be increased by more than for lower quality goods. This leads to heterogeneous pricing-to-market which is stronger for higher quality goods (i.e., passthrough is lower). In turn, this implies that the response of export volumes to a real depreciation decreases with quality. This mechanism is similar to Berman et al. (2012) and Chatterjee et al. (2013) although their focus is on productivity di¤erences in driving heterogeneous pricing-to-market across exporters, or exporters and products, respectively.
Cross-Country Heterogeneity in the Preference for Quality
In the previous section we assumed that the preference for quality is homogeneous across destination countries. The evidence in the literature however suggests that consumer preferences for quality may vary from one country to the other as preferences are a¤ected by per capita income. In particular, consumers in richer countries are expected to have stronger preferences for higher quality products so the consumption of higher quality goods is increasing in per capita income. 18 Hallak (2006) …nds that rich countries tend to import relatively more from countries that produce higher quality goods. We therefore extend the model to allow for non-homothetic preferences for quality. 19 Let us assume that the Home country now exports to only two destinations , where  is either high or low income. We build on Crinò and Epifani (2012) and assume that the preference for quality is increasing in per capita income. The utility function becomes (also, see Hallak, 2006 )
18 Crinò and Epifani (2012) …nd that the preference for quality is on average 20 times larger in the richest (the US) than in the poorest location (Africa) in their sample. Verhoogen (2008) assumes that Northern consumers are more willing to pay for quality than Southern consumers. Manova and Zhang (2012a) …nd that Chinese exporters charge higher FOB prices for the same product when exported to richer destination countries.
19 Di¤erences in consumer preferences across countries could also be due to speci…c consumer tastes or needs. For instance, US consumers have a preference for fruiter wines with less alcoholic content while Europeans prefer less fruity wines with higher alcohol content (Artopoulos et al., 2011). where  (  ) captures the intensity of preference for quality with respect to per capita income   and      so countries with higher per capita income have a stronger preference for quality. Local distribution costs are thus higher in high income countries as     () (  ) increases in per capita income. 2021 This allows us to derive two additional predictions that can be tested in the data.
Prediction 3
The …rm-and product-speci…c elasticity of the export price   () to a change in the real exchange rate   , denoted by    , increases with the quality of the good exported ((© )) but by more for high income than for low income countries:
The …rm-and product-speci…c elasticity of the volume of exports   () to a change in the real exchange rate   , denoted by    , decreases with the quality of the good exported ((© )) but by more for high income than for low income countries:
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data set gathers information from di¤erent sources: …rm-level exports customs data, wine experts quality ratings and macroeconomic data.
Firm-Level Exports Customs Data
Before the 1990s, Argentinean wines were rarely exported to international markets. Since then, wine exports started to gain strength thanks to the successful strategies implemented by one of the main wine producers, Nicolás Catena Zapata. 22 Catena played a key role in making Argentinean wines internationally recognized, and the growth in the wine sector that followed was hence spectacular: by the mid-2000s, Argentina was the eighth wine exporter and the …fth wine producer in the world. 23 During the 2000s, the sector continued to boom and exports more than tripled between 2002 and 2009. 20 If wages are assumed to be the same in high and low income countries, distribution costs increase in per capita income. If, in addition, wages are assumed to be higher in rich than in poor countries, i.e.,   , then the gap in distribution costs between high and low income countries becomes even larger. 21 Using data from the World Bank national income comparison project, Dornbusch (1989) shows that the prices of services are lower in poor than in rich countries, suggesting that local distribution costs are lower in low income countries. 22 For further insights about the Argentinean wine industry, see Artopoulos et al. (2011) . Catena is considered as an "export pioneer" in the Argentinean wine industry as he is the …rst to have established a stable presence in the markets of developed economies thanks to a strong knowledge about foreign markets and in particular the US. For instance, he promoted Argentinean wines by organizing a "promotional tour that included a sophisticated tango-dance show so as to associate his wines with other recognized symbols of high quality in Argentina" (Artopoulos et al., 2011) . He also had his wines reviewed by specialized magazines such as the Wine Spectator, and the positive reviews he received helped him to promote his wines abroad. 23 For a detailed list of wine production by country see http://www.wineinstitute.org.
The …rm-level exports data we use are from the Argentinean customs and are provided to us by a private vendor called Nosis. For each export ‡ow we have the name of the exporting …rm, the country of destination, the date of declaration, the 12-digit HS02 classi…cation code, the FOB value of exports (in US dollars) and the volume (in liters) exported between 2002 and 2009. 24 We also have the name/brand of the wine exported, its type (red, white or rosé), grape (Malbec, Chardonnay, etc.) and vintage year. 25 Figure 1 compares the total value of Argentina's wine exports from our customs data set with the value reported in the Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade) of the United Nations (HS code 2204). The data coincide extremely well.
Given that actual export prices are not available we proxy for them using the unit values of exports in local currency, computed as the ratio of the export value in Argentinean pesos divided by the corresponding export volume in liters. 26 In order to convert the value of exports (in US dollars) into pesos we use the peso to US dollar exchange rate in the month in which the shipment took place. We then aggregate the data at an annual frequency.
We clean up the data in several ways. First, we drop any wine for which either the name, grape, type or vintage year is missing, cannot be recognized or is classi…ed as "Unde…ned." Second, we only keep the export ‡ows recorded as Free on Board (FOB). 27 Third, as the experts rankings we rely on to measure quality are only for red, white or rosé wines, we drop all sparkling wines, dessert wines and other special varieties. Fourth, as we are interested in how product quality a¤ects the pricing and export decisions of …rms, and in turn need to control for the performance of wine exporters in the regressions, we restrict our analysis to wine producers and therefore to the manufacturing sector only -which requires us to drop wholesalers and retailers. The Instituto Nacional de Vinticultura's (INV), the government's controlling body for the wine industry, provides us with the names of all the …rms authorized to produce and sell wine as well as their activity classi…cation. We match the exporters names from the customs data with the list of wine …rms provided by the INV and only keep wine producers. Fifth, we drop a number of typos which we are unable to …x. For instance we exclude the very few cases where the vintage year reported is ahead of the year in which the exports took place. We also drop the few observations where the value of exports is positive but the corresponding volume is zero. Finally, we also exclude a few outliers: for each exporter, we drop the observations where unit values are larger or smaller than 100 times the median export unit value charged by the …rm.
The recent papers on heterogeneous pass-through typically de…ne a "product" according to trade classi…cations such as the Harmonized System or the Combined Nomenclature (e.g., Amiti et al., 24 Due to con…dentiality reasons imposed by Argentinean law, the customs data cannot make the name of the exporter public. However, after buying the data directly from Argentinean customs, Nosis combines its own market knowledge with an algorithm that compares export transactions in order to generate a "…rst probable exporter," a "second probable exporter" and a "third probable exporter." To determine the exporter's identity we then proceeded as follows. Using from the Instituto Nacional de Vinticultura (INV) the names of all wines and of the …rms authorized to produce and sell them we compared, for each wine name, the name of the …rst probable exporter with the authorized exporter reported by the INV. If this name coincided we kept the …rst probable exporter. Otherwise we repeated the same procedure with the second probable exporter, and …nally with the third probable exporter. 25 Wines in Argentina follow the tradition of New World Wines which are produced outside the traditional wine regions of Europe. Under Argentinean regulations, a wine must contain at least 80 percent of a grape for the grape name to appear on the label. Otherwise it is classi…ed as a blend. 26 In the paper we use the terms unit values and prices interchangeably. 27 Some ‡ows are recorded as Cost, Insurance and Freight, Delivered duty paid or unpaid, Free alongside ship, etc.
2012; Auer and Chaney, 2009; Berman et al., 2012; Chatterjee et al., 2013 ). As Table 1 shows, the 6-digit HS02 classi…cation categorizes wines into four di¤erent categories according to whether they are sparkling or not and to the capacity of the containers in which they are shipped (i.e., larger or smaller than two liters). Argentina further disaggregates the HS02 classi…cation at the 12-digit level, but this only enlarges the number of di¤erent categories, or "products," to eleven. 28 The problem is that changes in unit values de…ned at this level may re ‡ect compositional changes rather than price changes as there may be more than one distinct product within a single HS code. In contrast, the detail provided by our data set allows us to de…ne an individual product as a combination between a wine name, type, grape, vintage year and the capacity of the container used for shipping (identi…ed using the HS02 code) so that compositional changes are unlikely to a¤ect unit values. 29 Our cleaned sample includes a total of 21,647 di¤erent products/wines of which 6,720 can be matched with quality rankings. The 6,720 wines only represent 31 percent of all wines but 58 percent of the total FOB value exported between 2002 and 2009. 30 We close this section with descriptive statistics on the sample we use for the estimations. Table  2 summarizes our trade data by year and shows that the exports included in our sample increased threefold between 2002 and 2009. A total of 794 wines were exported by 59 di¤erent …rms in 2002 while in 2009 this increased to 151 …rms exporting 1,833 di¤erent wines. Over the whole period, our sample includes 6,720 wines exported by 209 di¤erent wine producers. 31 And as shown by Table 3 , these …rms exported an average of 139 di¤erent wines, ranging from a minimum of one to a maximum of 510 (in the sample only 15 …rms appear as having exported one wine only; in reality, they exported more than one wine but only one could be matched with the quality rankings). Exporters charged between 2 cents and 381 US dollars per liter of wine exported with an average of …ve US dollars per liter. Firms exported to an average number of 40 di¤erent destinations, from a minimum of one to a maximum of 88. Table 4 shows that with the exception of Brazil, Argentinean wine exporters mostly sell to developed economies, the United States being the top destination market.
Quality Ratings
The editors of the Wine Spectator magazine review more than 15,000 wines each year in blind tastings and publish their rankings in several issues throughout the year. 32 The rankings are given on a (50,100) scale according to the name of the wine, its grape, type and vintage year which are characteristics we all observe in the customs data set. A larger score implies a higher quality. Table 5 lists the six di¤erent categories the wines fall in depending on the score they are given.
We match the wines from the customs data set with the ones reviewed by the Wine Spectator by name, type, grape and vintage year so that each wine is assigned a single quality ranking. We end up with 6,720 wines exported by 209 …rms over the 2002-2009 period. As can be seen from Table 3 , the mean ranking is 85, the lowest-rated wine receives a score of 55 and the highest receives a score 28 As we drop sparkling wines and sweet wines from the sample, the HS02 codes listed in Table 1 29 Also, in our data set each wine is produced and exported by one …rm only while a product de…ned at the HS level can instead be produced and therefore exported by more than one …rm. 30 The issue of sample coverage is addressed in the robustness section. 31 We observe 882 di¤erent wine names, 23 grapes, three types and 22 vintage years (between 1977 and 2009 We rely on the Wine Spectator for our baseline regressions because it has the largest coverage of Argentinean wines. However, in the robustness section we check the sensitivity of our results using an alternative rating produced by Robert Parker. 33 Parker is a leading US wine critic who assesses wines based on blind tastings and publishes his consumer advice and rankings in a bimonthly publication, the Wine Advocate. His rating system also employs a (50,100) point scale where wines are ranked according to their name, type, grape and vintage year and where a larger value indicates a higher quality. Table 5 lists the di¤erent categories considered by Parker. Compared to the Wine Spectator the scores are slightly more generous (for instance, a wine ranked 74 is "Not recommended" by the Wine Spectator but is "Average" according to Parker). 34 We can match the customs data and the Parker rankings for 3,969 wines exported by 181 …rms. Table 3 shows that the scores vary between 72 and 98 with an average of 87. Again, the distribution across wines is very symmetric as the mean and the median are equal. Figure 2 plots the Wine Spectator and Parker rankings. A total of 2,433 wines exported by 135 …rms have rankings from both sources. The correlation between the two rankings is 0.53. Table 6 provides a snapshot of our data. For con…dentiality reasons we cannot report the exporter nor the wine names so these are replaced by numbers and letters instead. The table shows that, whether we use the Wine Spectator or the Parker ratings, individual …rms export wines with varying levels of quality (between 55 and 89 for Firm 1 and 74 and 90 for Firm 2). In addition, higher quality wines are, on average, sold at a higher price. Finally, the 
Macroeconomic Data
The data on GDPs are from the Penn World Tables and the consumer price indices and nominal exchange rates from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund. The real exchange rate is de…ned as the ratio of consumer price indices times the average yearly nominal exchange rate so an increase of the exchange rate captures a real depreciation of the peso. The nominal exchange rates are available for each country relative to the US dollar, which we then 33 See https://www.erobertparker.com. 34 Crozet et al. (2012) also note that Parker is slightly more generous compared to other raters of Champagne. 35 In both examples the same wine is sold at a lower price when exported to the largest destination market. It might therefore be that exporters sell at a lower price if the quantity demanded is larger.
convert to be relative to the Argentinean peso. The real e¤ective exchange rates are sourced from the IFS and the Bank of International Settlements where an increase indicates a real depreciation.
During the 2002-2009 period, Argentina witnessed major nominal exchange rate ‡uctuations. Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the monthly nominal exchange rate between the Argentinean peso and the US dollar. After the …nancial crisis of 2001, the …xed exchange rate system was abandoned and as a result the peso depreciated in 2002 by up to 75 percent. The export boom that followed lead to a massive in ‡ow of US dollars into the economy which helped to depreciate the US dollar compared to the peso. The peso then remained stable until 2008 when it depreciated again with the advent of the global …nancial crisis and the increase in domestic in ‡ation.
Empirical Framework
Prediction 1 states that following a real depreciation exporters increase their export price and this increase is larger the higher quality is. In order to check whether this relationship holds in the data we estimate the following reduced-form regression
where     is the export unit value of …rm  exporting a product  to destination country  in year , expressed in pesos per liter of wine exported and is our proxy for export prices.   is the average real exchange rate between Argentina and country  in year  (an increase in   captures a real depreciation). The quality of wine  is denoted by     where the   index refers to the Wine Spectator rankings. Given the level of disaggregation of the data, changes in real exchange rates are assumed to be exogenous to the pricing (and quantity) decisions of individual …rms.
The export price in the exporter's currency is a markup over marginal costs (Knetter, 1989 (Knetter, , 1993 . As a result, in order to identify a pricing-to-market behavior which requires markups to respond to exchange rate changes, the regression needs to control for …rm-speci…c marginal costs which we denote by   . 36 Without any additional information on the exporters, we rely on a number of proxies that have been shown in the literature to correlate strongly with productivity/marginal costs. First is the average size of the …rm,   , measured by the total volume of FOB exports by each …rm in each year. Second is the total number of destination countries where each …rm exports in each year,   . 37 Besides, we include year …xed e¤ects   to control for aggregate shocks that are common to all Argentinean exporters. We perform within estimations by including …rm-destination   …xed e¤ects. As product …xed e¤ects cannot be included (they are perfectly collinear with quality), we instead control for product characteristics by including grape   , type   , vintage year   , HS02   and province  of origin   …xed e¤ects. Fixed e¤ects for the wine names/brand are not included as they are collinear with the …rm …xed e¤ects (because each brand is sold by one …rm only).  1   2   3 and  4 are coe¢cients to be estimated and    is an error term. Given that all variables 36 The approach of distinguishing between changes in marginal costs from changes in markups has …rst been proposed by Knetter (1989 Knetter ( , 1993 . 37 Alternatively we could consider the total number of liters of wine exported by each …rm in each year as a proxy for …rm size but we do not as this variable appears in the denominator of the unit values ratio. are in levels (rather than …rst di¤erences), the estimated coe¢cients can be thought of as capturing the long term response of unit values to changes in each of the explanatory variables. Finally, as quality takes on a single value for each product, robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the product level.
Following a real depreciation, exporters are expected to increase their markups and therefore their export prices so  1 should be positive.  1 captures the extent of pricing-to-market so pass-through is given by (1 ¡  1 ) . 38 Higher quality is expected to increase export prices so  2 should be positive too. The coe¢cient of interest is  3 , the coe¢cient on the interaction between the real exchange rate and quality which captures heterogeneous pricing-to-market. According to Prediction 1, the response of unit values to a real depreciation should increase with quality in which case  3 should be positive.
Prediction 2 relates to export volumes. It states that following a real depreciation, exporters increase their volume of exports but by less for higher quality products. To test this prediction we estimate
where     is the FOB export volume (in pesos) of …rm  exporting a product  to destination country  in year . To be consistent with standard gravity models we include destination-year speci…c variables   such as destination country's GDP,   , and real e¤ective exchange rate   as a proxy for country 's price index (Berman et al., 2012) . If a real depreciation increases exports  1 should be positive. And if this increase is smaller for higher quality products the coe¢cient on the interaction term  3 should be negative.
Baseline Results
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of estimating equation (11) for unit values. Column (1) only includes the exchange rate, quality and …rm size as regressors and shows that higher quality wines are sold at a higher price, which is consistent with Crozet et al. (2012) for Champagne. When the real exchange rate depreciates, exporters signi…cantly increase their export prices: following a 10 percent depreciation they raise their prices (in pesos) by 1.1 percent so that on average pass-through is 89 percent. The large degree of pass-through we …nd for the wine industry is therefore consistent with the …ndings of other papers that use …rm-level data but for the whole manufacturing sector. For instance, pass-through is estimated at 92 percent for French exporters (Berman et al., 2012) , 94 percent for Chinese exporters (Li et al., 2012) , 77 percent for Brazilian exporters (Chatterjee et al., 2013) , 86 percent for Danish exporters (Fosse, 2012) and at 79 percent for Belgian exporters (Amiti et al., 2012) .
The estimated coe¢cient on the exchange rate reported in column (1) however hides a signi…cant amount of heterogeneity in the degree of pass-through across products. To see this, column (2) adds the interaction term between the exchange rate and quality. Its estimated coe¢cient is positive and signi…cant which is evidence of heterogeneous pass-through, lending support to Prediction 1 in that the elasticity of export prices to a real depreciation increases with quality. If we calculate the elasticity for the lowest quality wine in the sample (with a ranking of 55) it is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero suggesting that pass-through is complete. In contrast, for the highest quality wine (with a score of 97) the elasticity is positive and equal to 0.135 (signi…cant at the one percent level) so pass-through drops to 86.5 percent. The di¤erence in pass-through between the highest and lowest quality wines in the sample is therefore equal to 13.5 percent. These results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Auer and Chaney (2009) and the empirical results of Auer et al. (2012) .
In column (3) we use the number of export destinations for each …rm as an alternative proxy for …rm productivity. Its estimated coe¢cient is not signi…cant, but most importantly our main conclusions regarding heterogeneous pass-through remain una¤ected. 39 Column (4) restricts the sample to multiproduct …rms only, where a multi-product …rm is de…ned as a …rm-destination-year triplet with strictly more than one wine exported but the results also remain unchanged.
In column (5) we check if our results hold in a di¤erence-in-di¤erence speci…cation which includes destination-year and product …xed e¤ects instead of the ones speci…ed in equation (11). Both the exchange rate and quality drop from the regression, but the interaction term between the exchange rate and quality can be estimated. Although its estimated coe¢cient decreases in magnitude and in signi…cance, it still indicates that the elasticity of export prices to exchange rates is larger for higher quality wines. Table 7 reports the results of estimating equation (12) for export volumes. From column (1) export volumes react positively to a real depreciation. The elasticity is large and equal to 1.906, which is consistent with evidence in the literature that the trade elasticities for emerging economies are generally larger than for developed countries. 40 The coe¢cient on quality is negative and signi…cant while the literature usually points to a positive relationship between trade and quality (for example, see Crozet et al., 2012) . One crucial di¤erence between our regressions and, for instance, Crozet et al. (2012) , however, is that we estimate the within-…rm e¤ect of quality on export volumes. The negative coe¢cient on quality therefore indicates that when a …rm exports several wines with di¤erent levels of quality to a given destination, the high quality wines are on average exported in smaller quantities than the low quality wines. This is consistent with San Martín, Troncoso and Brümmer (2008) who observe that more sophisticated, high quality wines are generally produced in smaller quantities.
Panel B of
The interaction between the exchange rate and quality is included in column (2). Consistent with Prediction 2, it is negative and signi…cant suggesting that the response of export volumes to exchange rates decreases with quality. This …nding remains robust to the use of the number of export destinations as a measure of …rm performance (column 3) and to restricting the sample to multi-product …rms only (column 4). The di¤erence-in-di¤erence speci…cation in column (5) does not provide any evidence of a heterogeneous response of export volumes to exchange rates driven by quality.
Heterogeneity across Destination Countries
Predictions 3 and 4 state that the e¤ects described by Predictions 1 and 2 for unit values and export volumes, respectively, should be stronger for high income than for low income destination countries. This section investigates whether the two predictions can be validated by the data.
The destination countries included in our data set are split between high and low income according to the World Bank's classi…cation based on GNI per capita in 2011. Low income countries have a GNI per capita of less than $4,035 while high income countries are above that threshold. We then estimate equations (11) and (12) for unit values and export volumes and interact the real exchange rate, as well as the real exchange rate interacted with quality, with a dummy for high () and a dummy for low () income destination countries. 41 The results for unit values are reported in Panel A of Table 8 . According to column (1), higher quality is again associated with higher prices and the coe¢cients on the real exchange rate, both for low and high income countries, are of similar magnitude. However, only the coe¢cient for high income countries is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero so while pass-through is estimated as being complete for low income destinations, it decreases to approximately 90 percent for exports to high income countries. This indicates that price discrimination exists across destination countries and that the Law of One Price fails. This …nding is also consistent with predictions from the literature that pricing-to-market should be stronger for higher income countries. For instance, Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004) predict that a more stable monetary policy in high income destination countries reduces exchange rate pass-through by increasing the probability of invoicing in the currency of the destination country.
Column (2) further interacts the exchange rate with quality and interestingly, the coe¢cient on the interaction term is signi…cant for high income destinations only. As a result, for low income countries the response of unit values to exchange rate changes does not vary with quality (the elasticities for the wines with the highest and lowest quality in the sample are both insigni…cant and are not statistically di¤erent from each other at the 81 percent level). In contrast, for high income countries the response of unit values to exchange rate changes increases with quality. Pass-through is complete for the lowest quality wine and decreases to 86 percent for the highest quality wine in the sample. These …ndings lend support to Prediction 3.
The …nding that pass-through varies with quality for high income destination countries only is robust to the use of the number of destinations as a control for …rm productivity (column 3), to restricting the sample to multi-product …rms (column 4) and to the inclusion of destination-year and product …xed e¤ects (column 5). Table 8 focuses on export volumes. Overall, the results …nd strong support for Prediction 4. Column (1) shows that a real depreciation raises export volumes to both low and high income destination countries. Consistent with the …ndings in Panel A, column (2) shows that the interaction between the real exchange rate and quality is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero for high income countries only, and its negative sign further indicates that the response of export volumes to a real depreciation is smaller for higher quality wines. These …ndings remain robust in the other columns of the table, except when destination-year and product …xed e¤ects are included in column (5).
Panel B of

Robustness
In this section we discuss a number of alternative speci…cations we implement to ensure the robustness of our …ndings. Overall, the broad similarity of the resulting patterns is supportive of the paper's main conclusions. 42
The Measurement of Quality
We run a few sensitivity checks on the measurement of quality. Column (1) of Table 9 regresses equation (11) using the log of quality     instead of its level. The results remain qualitatively unchanged, and as before pass-through is 13 percent lower for the highest quality than for the lowest quality wine in the sample.
In order to minimize possible noise in the measurement of quality when de…ned on a (50,100) scale, we construct a new variable, denoted by e     , which takes on values between one and six where each value corresponds to one of the di¤erent bins de…ned by the Wine Spectator (see Table 5 ). A value of one indicates that the wine is "Not recommended" while a value of six that the wine is "Great" so a larger value captures a higher quality. The results of using e     as a regressor in (11) are reported in column (2) and remain qualitatively similar. There are three di¤erences, however. First, the magnitude of the coe¢cient on quality becomes larger. Second, for the lowest quality wine in the sample (with a score of 1) pass-through is incomplete and equal to 90 percent. Third, the di¤erence in pass-through between the highest and the lowest quality wines in the sample is equal to four percent.
In columns (3) and (4) quality is measured using the Parker rankings and is denoted by    . The regression in column (3) includes all wines for which the Parker rankings are available while column (4) restricts the sample to the wines for which both the Parker and the Wine Spectator rankings are simultaneously available. Qualitatively, our results largely hold up. However, the coe¢cient on    is larger than the one on the Wine Spectator rankings. Also, pass-through is incomplete at about 90 percent for the lowest quality wine in the sample, and the di¤erence in pass-through between the wines with the highest and lowest quality is about 10 percent.
Recall that due to missing observations on the Wine Spectator rankings, our sample covers 58 percent of the total FOB value exported by Argentina between 2002 and 2009. In order to increase the sample coverage, we calculate an average Wine Spectator ranking by wine name and type and assign this average ranking to all wines with the same name and type. This increases our sample coverage to 85 percent of the total FOB value exported over the period. We apply this procedure to compute average quality on a (50,100) scale, denoted by     , and on a (1,6) scale, denoted by e     where the  index indicates that quality varies by name and type only. The results of using either     or e     are respectively reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 10 and remain qualitatively una¤ected. Table 10 replicates the same speci…cations as in Table 9 but using FOB export volumes as a dependent variable. Our results remain robust to the log of quality, quality de…ned on a (1,6) scale, the Parker rankings or the average quality measure de…ned by wine name and type (in column 5 the coe¢cient on average quality     is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero).
The Endogeneity of Quality
One concern with our estimations is the potential endogeneity of quality in explaining unit values and export volumes. The Wine Spectator rankings are produced from blind tastings where the "price is not taken into account in scoring." However, the "tasters are told [...] the general type of wine (varietal and/or region) and the vintage" year. 43 Similarly for Parker, "neither the price nor the reputation of the producer/grower a¤ect the rating in any manner" although the "tastings are done in peer-group, single-blind conditions (meaning that the same types of wines are tasted against each other and the producers names are not known)." 44 In other words, even if the two rankings are una¤ected by the price, the tasters do have some basic information about the wines they taste which might in turn a¤ect in a way or the other their scores, leading to an endogeneity bias which direction is, however, unclear. We therefore address the potential endogeneity of quality by using appropriate instruments.
The set of instruments we rely on to explain the variation in wine quality includes geographic and weather-related factors. Indeed, the literature devoted to explaining the quality of wine highlights that the amount of rainfall and the average temperatures during the growing season are strong determinants of quality (Ashenfelter, 2008; Ramirez, 2008) . In the Southern hemisphere, the growing period spans the period from September (in the year before the vintage year) to March. In order to allow for the e¤ects of temperature and rainfall to be nonlinear throughout the growing season, we consider as instruments the average temperature   and the total amount of rainfall   for each growing province  in each month  between September and March (Ramirez, 2008) . 45 Besides, one particularity of Argentina's wine industry is the high altitude at which some of the growing regions are located, and there are strong reasons to believe that altitude contributes to variations in quality because it reduces the problems related to insects or grape diseases that a¤ect quality at a low altitude. We therefore use the altitude   of each province  as an additional instrument for quality. 46 The data on monthly average temperatures (in degrees Celsius), total rainfall (in millimeters) and altitude (in meters) are from the National Climatic Data Center of the US Department of Commerce. 47 Gaps in the data are …lled using online information, although missing information for some provinces and vintage years results in a slightly reduced sample. 48 Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the average temperatures and total rainfall across growing regions. On average, temperatures are highest in January and lowest in September. January is also the wettest month and September the driest. As the instruments are only available over a reduced sample, we …rst replicate our benchmark OLS estimations reported in column (2) of Panels A and B of Table 7 for unit values and export volumes, respectively. The results, reported in column (7) of Tables 9 and 10 for prices and quantities show that our main …ndings go through over the smaller sample.
Column (8) of Table 9 regresses by Instrumental Variables (IV) unit values on the real exchange rate, quality and …rm size. The coe¢cient on quality is positive and signi…cant but becomes smaller compared to the OLS estimate in column (7). This positive endogeneity bias suggests that wine tasters tend to assign higher scores to more expensive wines. Column (8) of Table 10 focuses on export volumes. The instrumented e¤ect of quality on export volumes is negative and signi…cant, and is in turn larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate in column (7). For both regressions, the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic (equal to 44 for both the prices and quantities regressions, where the critical value is equal to 21, Stock and Yogo, 2005) largely rejects the null of weak correlation between the excluded instruments and the endogenous regressors.
The …rst-stage regressions for the two IV regressions (not reported due to space constraints but available upon request) show that climate variation a¤ects wine quality. The results are somewhat erratic, but the positive coe¢cient on the February temperature is consistent with the …nding in the literature that warmer temperatures during the harvest period (i.e., February/March in the Southern hemisphere) are typically associated with higher quality (the negative coe¢cient on the March temperature is therefore counterintuitive). Also, the positive coe¢cients on the October and December rainfall, and the negative coe¢cients on the January and February precipitations, are consistent with the expectation that precipitation during the earlier part of the growing season is good for quality while a dry climate during the harvest period is more favorable for crops (Ramirez, 2008) .
We then regress unit values and export volumes on quality which is further interacted with the exchange rate. The set of instruments for quality and for the interaction term now includes the monthly temperatures, monthly rainfall and altitude variables as well as each of the variables interacted with the exchange rate. 49 The results for unit values are reported in column (9) of Table 9 and show that exchange rate pass-through is larger for lower quality wines. Interestingly, the di¤erence in passthrough between the highest and lowest quality wines in the sample increases to 19 percent, suggesting that quality is quantitatively important in explaining heterogeneous pass-through (the elasticity of export prices to a change in the real exchange rate is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero for the lowest quality wine but is signi…cant at the one percent level at a value of 0.189 for the highest quality wine in the sample). For export volumes in column (9) of Table 10 , the coe¢cient on the interaction term is not statistically signi…cant.
Currency of Invoicing
A large body of the recent literature is devoted to understanding how the currency of invoicing used for trade a¤ects exchange rate pass-through (Gopinath et al., 2010, show there is a large di¤erence in exchange rate pass-through for US imports priced in US dollars versus non US dollars). In our data set we do not have any information on the currency in which Argentinean wine exporters price their exports. The Datamyne, a private vendor of international trade data, provides us with the invoicing currency of exports for the whole wine sector (HS code 2204) between 2005 and 2008. It shows that over the period, Argentinean …rms priced their wine exports mostly in US dollars (88 percent), followed by Euros (7.6 percent), Canadian dollars (3 percent), Sterling (1.2 percent) and in a very few cases in Yen, Swiss francs, Uruguayan pesos, Australian dollars or Danish krone. Due to the predominance of the US dollar as an invoicing currency for exports, the regressions in column (1) of Tables 11 and 12 express unit values in US dollars per liter and exports in US dollars, respectively. Remarkably, our results remain largely una¤ected once we allow for exports to be invoiced in US dollars.
Sample Periods
After the …xed exchange rate regime between the Argentinean peso and the US dollar was abandoned in 2001, the peso depreciated greatly with respect to the US dollar throughout 2002, as can be seen from Figure 3 . In column (2) of Table 11 we check and con…rm that our results still hold when restricting the sample to the post-2002 period. If we calculate the responses of prices to changes in currency values for the lowest and highest quality wines in the sample, both are slightly smaller than in the whole sample (the elasticity is equal to 0.046 but is insigni…cant for the lowest quality wine while it is signi…cant at the one percent level at a value of 0.120 for the highest quality wine), suggesting that pricing-to-market is stronger when exchange rates are more variable. This …nding is consistent with Martín and Rodríguez (2004) who …nd more pricing-to-market by Spanish …rms over the period 1993-1995 when the domestic currency was signi…cantly devalued. In turn, from column (2) of Table  12 we can calculate the responses of quantities to changes in exchange rates for the lowest and highest quality wines in the sample and both are larger than in the whole sample (the two elasticities are signi…cant at the one percent level and are equal to 3.407 for the lowest quality wine and to 3.245 for the highest quality wine in the sample).
Our results might also be a¤ected by the …nancial crisis that started in 2008: as Figure 3 shows, the peso started to depreciate again with respect to the US dollar. In addition, the crisis might have prompted consumers to substitute towards lower quality imported goods (a " ‡ight from quality e¤ect," see Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2005) . Finally, the crisis might have impacted the …nancial constraints of some wine exporters. Column (3) of Table 11 therefore restricts the analysis to the pre-2008 sample period. Three comments are in order. First, our main conclusions still hold: the elasticity of export prices to changes in the exchange rate continues to be signi…cantly larger for higher quality wines. Second, pass-through is incomplete for the lowest quality wine in the sample (the elasticity of prices to exchange rates is signi…cant at the one percent level and equal to 0.223). Third, pass-through is on average lower than when estimated over the full sample: for both the lowest and highest quality wines, pass-through is estimated at 77.7 and 72.3 percent, respectively. This indicates that before the crisis, Argentinean exporters had a stronger tendency to price-to-market. Strasser (2013) shows that …nancially constrained …rms price-to-market less than unconstrained …rms. So if Argentinean exporters have become more …nancially constrained with the crisis and as a result priceto-market less, dropping the post-2008 period from the sample should result in more pricing-to-market and less pass-through (for any given level of quality), as we …nd (Strasser, 2013 , argues that the e¤ect of borrowing constraints has been particularly strong during the recent …nancial crisis). Regarding export volumes in the pre-2008 sample (column 3 of Table 12 ), the coe¢cient on the interaction term between the real exchange rate and quality is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Extensive Margin
Campos (2010) argues that the intensive and extensive margins of adjustment might have opposite e¤ects on pass-through. On the one hand, a depreciation reduces the average price charged by existing exporters (the intensive margin). But on the other hand, a depreciation makes exporting a more pro…table activity so more …rms enter the export market. Given that entrants are generally less productive and therefore charge higher prices, the extensive margin pushes the average export price up, reducing pass-through. As a robustness check we estimate both equations (11) and (12) Tables 11 and 12 , respectively, and remain robust to the exclusion of the extensive margin.
The US Dollar
After the large devaluation of the peso in 2002, the peso was allowed to ‡uctuate within a "crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2 percent" with respect to the US dollar (Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2004) . This means that variations in the real exchange rate between the peso and the US dollar may essentially come from movements in domestic prices. We verify that our results still hold after excluding from the sample the US (which is also Argentina's main export destination for wine) as well as the US plus all the other countries which currencies are pegged to the US dollar (Li et al., 2012) . 50 The results are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Tables 11 and 12 for prices and quantities, respectively, and remain largely robust.
The Argentinean CPI
There is a widespread suspicion among policymakers and academics that the Argentinean government has been manipulating the o¢cial CPI data starting in 2007, in which case the real exchange rate we use for our estimations is unreliable in 2008 and 2009. 51 Using online data from supermarket chains, Cavallo (2013) constructs an aggregate CPI for Argentina and shows that the corresponding in ‡ation rate is about three times larger than the o¢cial estimate. We use the CPI from Cavallo (2013) for 2008 and 2009 to update the o¢cial CPI series and construct a new real exchange rate, denoted by e   , that we use to estimate both equations (11) and (12). The results are reported in column (7) of Tables 11 and 12 and remain very similar to the ones obtained with the o¢cial CPI data. 50 These countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, China, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Hong Kong, Jordan, the Maldives, the Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Venezuela (Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2004) . 51 See http://www.economist.com/node/21548242.
Monthly Frequency
The customs data are originally provided to us at the transactions level as we have the date of declaration for each shipment. We therefore check whether our results remain robust to aggregating the data at a monthly rather than at a yearly frequency. We estimate equations (11) and (12) where unit values     , export volumes     and the real exchange rate   are de…ned at a monthly frequency  and where month rather than year …xed e¤ects are included. Due to data limitations, the GDPs and real e¤ective exchange rates in the exports regression are measured annually. For simplicity, average …rm size is also de…ned at a yearly frequency (but in results available upon request we show that the results remain robust to measuring …rm size at a monthly frequency).
Column (8) of Table 11 focuses on unit values. Although the coe¢cient on quality decreases in magnitude, the results remain highly comparable to the ones obtained at an annual frequency. Pricing-to-market is signi…cantly stronger for higher quality wines, and the di¤erence in pass-through between the wines with the highest and lowest qualities in the sample is equal to 10 percent (the elasticity for the lowest quality wine is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero while for the highest quality wine it is signi…cant at the one percent level and equal to 0.102). For export volumes, the results in column (8) of Table 12 also remain qualitatively similar to the annual frequency estimates. Again, the coe¢cient on quality is smaller. Noteworthy is the fact that the coe¢cient on the real exchange rate is much reduced. Still the regression shows that export volumes increase in response to a real depreciation, and by less for higher quality wines.
Local Distribution Costs
The model of Corsetti and Dedola (2005) and our extension to their model both predict that pricingto-market increases with local distribution costs in the importing economy. In turn this implies that the di¤erence in pass-through between high and low quality wines should increase with distribution costs. Berman et al. (2012) use the data on distribution costs computed by Campa and Goldberg (2010) for 21 countries and 29 industries between 1995 and 2001 and …nd that the response of unit values to a real depreciation increases with local costs, especially for high productivity …rms.
In order to investigate the role of local distribution costs we also rely on Campa and Goldberg's (2010) data. Given they are only available between 1995 and 2001 we compute the average distribution costs over time for each of the 21 destination countries and for the "Food products and beverages" industry only. Our measure for distribution costs,   , is therefore destination-speci…c, and given the limited number of countries for which the data are available the resulting sample size is reduced by half. We then estimate regressions (11) and (12) and include an additional interaction term between the real exchange rate and (log) distribution costs. The results are reported in column (9) of Table  11 for unit values. The interactions between the real exchange rate, on the one hand, and quality and distribution costs, on the other hand, are both positive and signi…cant (the latter is signi…cant at the 10 percent level only). Consistent with expectations, this shows that pricing-to-market increases with both product quality and local distribution costs so that the di¤erence in pass-through between high and low quality wines increases with the size of local costs. The results for export volumes are reported in column (9) of Table 12 but are not signi…cant.
Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the heterogeneous reaction of exporting …rms to changes in real exchange rates due to di¤erences in product quality. In order to understand the mechanisms through which quality a¤ects the pricing and quantity decisions of …rms following a real exchange rate change, the …rst contribution of the paper is to extend the model of Corsetti and Dedola (2005) and to allow …rms to export multiple products with heterogeneous levels of quality, where higher quality is characterized by higher marginal costs. In the presence of additive local distribution costs paid in the currency of the importing country, the model shows that the demand elasticity perceived by the exporter falls with a real depreciation and with quality. Exporters therefore increase their prices more and their export volumes less in response to a real depreciation for higher than for lower quality goods. Once we allow for higher income countries to have a stronger preference for higher quality goods, as the evidence from the empirical trade literature tends to suggest, the heterogeneous response of prices and quantities to exchange rate changes is predicted to be stronger for exports to high income destination countries.
The second contribution of the paper is to bring the testable predictions of the model to the data. We combine a unique data set of Argentinean …rm-level destination-speci…c export values and volumes of highly disaggregated wine products between 2002 and 2009 with a data set on two di¤erent experts wine ratings to measure quality (the Wine Spectator and Robert Parker). The very rich nature of the data set allows us to de…ne a "product" according to the name of the wine, its grape, type and vintage year, so the sample we rely on for our baseline regressions includes 6,720 di¤erent wine products exported by 209 wine producers over the period.
Our empirical results …nd strong support for the predictions of the model. First, pass-through is large: following a 10 percent real depreciation exporters increase their export prices by 1.1 percent so pass-through is 89 percent. Second, a higher quality is associated with higher prices. Third, the response of export prices to real exchange rate changes increases with quality and quantitatively, the e¤ect of quality in explaining heterogeneous pass-through is large. Fourth, export volumes increase following a real depreciation, but the increase is smaller for higher quality wines. Finally, the heterogeneous response of prices and quantities to real exchange rate ‡uctuations is only present when …rms export to high income destination countries. The results remain robust to di¤erent measures of quality, samples, speci…cations and to the potential endogeneity of quality.
To conclude, our …ndings help to understand the low exchange rate pass-through that is typically observed in aggregate data by highlighting the role played by product quality. But as we are only focusing on a single industry, we do not know whether the empirical regularities documented in this paper hold more generally. Provided better data to measure quality for other industries become available in the future, testing whether our results extend beyond the Argentinean wine industry is a promising avenue for future research. 
ln  3502 percent levels, respectively. In (8) and (9), the instruments include the monthly average temperatures and total rainfall per province over the growing period (September to March) and the altitude of each province, and the same variables interacted with the exchange rate, respectively. -- Notes: The dependent variable is ln     in (1)-(7) and (9) and ln     in (8). Unit values are in USD per liter in (1) and in pesos per liter in (2)-(9). Year, province, …rm-destination, grape, type, vintage year and HS02 …xed e¤ects are included. In (8), the year …xed e¤ects are replaced by month …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the product level. -statistics in parentheses.
 ,  and  indicate signi…cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
ln  2219 (1)- (7) and (9) and ln     in (8). Export volumes are in USD in (1) and in pesos in (2)-(9). Year, province, …rm-destination, grape, type, vintage year and HS02 …xed e¤ects are included. In (8), the year …xed e¤ects are replaced by month …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the product level. -statistics in parentheses.
